This gets rid of a little bit of code duplication, and makes the
interfaces all conform to one standard again after I05ed4b8 left them
in a little inconsistent (but properly documented) state.
Bug: T214970
Change-Id: If8407c1a48aff1cb31fc2e74b3c2b846e79a3cb5
Including tests for all situations.
I believe it is impossible or extremely hard to actually abuse any of
these places. All these data are not extracted from the current page, but
delivered either by MediaWiki's api.php or a RESTful endpoint, as
configured via $wgPopupsGateway and $wgPopupsRestGatewayEndpoint. A
possible attacker would need to write it's own endpoint (which must either
run on the same server or somehow ignore the CSRF token), and set the
value of mw.config.values.wgPopupsRestGatewayEndpoint on the client to
this endpoint – which requires just *another* attack vector to be able to
do this.
It's "the right thing"(tm) to escape all this anyway.
I found two possibly relevant security reviews of this extension, T88171
and T129177, resolved in 2015 and 2016.
Bug: T88171
Bug: T129177
Bug: T214754
Bug: T214971
Change-Id: I1d118c9ccaea434a253a772d18139b9b077118ab
